age points. On election night, based on the exit polls, all of the major networks gave Florida to Gore, then called it too close to call, then gave it to Bush and declared him the next president, and then reversed themselves again. Then, of course, there is Florida. After more than 3 weeks of dealing with voters who cannot punch ballots, election officials who cannot decide what the rules are, judges who cannot read laws straightforwardly, and election boards who cannot figure out how to count votes, after all of this, some forecasting errors do not look so bad.
On a brighter note, several of the models did not do too badly. Two (Abramowitz and Campbell) were within 3 percentage points or less of the actual vote. Nothing to write home about, but not devastating either. Beyond this, all of the models may learn from the 2000 election. This is not to say that 2000 may not have revealed some fatal flaws in some of the models, but it is only one case, and it is quite possible that a large error in a single case may be addressed by a fairly modest revision in a model. So, to the extent that the models were wrong, why? Each of the modelers will have their own interpretations in their "postmortems," but here are some possibilities that may apply generally.
First, because most of the models only go back as far as 1948 or 1952, they have little experience with open-seat presidential elections. Only four of these elections (1952, 1960, 1968, and 1988) lacked an incumbent in the race. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that an election without the incumbent would be less of a referendum on the past performance of the administration and its stewardship of the economy than one with the incumbent. With so few cases, there is not the leverage to obtain reliable estimates of interaction terms (with the economy with incumbency or approval rates with incumbency), but this may have been an important reason why the models using economy overpredicted the Gore vote. It is interesting to note that the Fair model, often thought of as an economic model, includes a personal incumbency variable worth between 4 and 5 percentage points of the vote. It is also worth noting that since 1828, the odds of a near dead-heat election (the winner having 51.5% of the vote or less) are nearly five times greater when there is no incumbent in the race.
Second, with some economic indicators reaching very high levels, the simple linearity assumption may have caused problems in some models. It is certainly reasonable to assume that there are diminishing political returns to a good economy. The increment of votes that a candidate might expect in moving from 2% to 3% growth should be much greater than in moving from 5% to 6%. It is unclear whether the economy was so good that seriously diminishing returns set in for this year's context, but some of the error in some of the models may be traced to this. As with the above interaction problem, the small number of cases complicates dealing with the nonlinearity issue, but adjustments can be made to address the problem.
Third, some of the models might reexamine "the time for a change" component or dynamic found in several models (Abramowitz, Fair, Holbrook, Lockerbie, and Norpoth). Despite a divisive nomination contest, Republicans quickly united behind Bush (as evidenced by his summer-long poll lead), whereas Democrats remained less united, with Nader's Green Party votes predominantly coming out of their base. After 8 years out of power, Republicans were ready to set aside internal party differences, and after 8 years in the White House, some Democrats took power for granted and lost their enthusiasm and perspective about the differences between the parties.
The fourth and fifth possible reasons for the errors are ones that could not be accommodated by any revision in the models. At the time that the forecasts were made, the economic indicators for the first half of the year or the second quarter were quite strong. The gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in the second quarter was the fourth strongest of the 14 election years since 1948. Public opinion assessments of the economy also indicated that the public appreciated this fact. However, from July through September, the economy slowed down appreciably. The Bureau of Economic Analysis indicates that GDP growth in the second quarter was 5.6%, and its estimates of growth in the third quarter dropped to just 2.2%. Unfortunately, information about thirdquarter conditions are not available at the time that the forecasts were made.
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Finally, this year there appeared to be a substantial mismatch in the quality of the two campaigns. Based on the strong first-half economy and the public's recognition of it, one would have naturally expected Al Gore to run a retrospective, stay-the-course, consensus-oriented campaign. He did just the opposite, presumably in some ill-considered attempt to avoid entanglement with the legacy of Clinton's scandals.
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